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REVISITING THE LICENSE V. SALE
CONUNDRUM
Nancy S. Kim*
This Article seeks to answer a question that has become
increasingly more important as commerce moves from the tangible to the
intangible—to what extent may a business use a contract to control the
use of a fully paid product? The characterization of a transaction as a
license or a sale determines what may be done with a product, who
controls how the product may be used, and what happens in the event of
a dispute. The past generation has seen a seismic shift in the way
businesses distribute their products to consumers. Businesses often
“license” rather than “sell” their products, and view consumers as
licensees, rather than owners, of the products they buy. Customers own
their print copies of books, movies, and music but merely license the same
content when they purchase it in digital form. The marketplace transition
from sale to license has far and wide ripple effects affecting a range of
issues from innovation to the environment. The rapid emergence of the
Internet of Things adds to the urgency and importance of the question—
are goods licensed or sold?
The question of whether a digital product is licensed or sold is often
conflated with the question of whether a product should be licensed or
sold. The problem lies, in large part, with the well-intentioned but
misguided turn that contract law has taken away from the intent of the
parties and toward a narrow vision of efficiency. When it comes to
commercial transactions, the narrow efficiency view prioritizes quantity
of completed transactions over quality, ignoring consumer expectations
and the way in which distrust creates uncertainty in the marketplace. This
Article proposes a methodology for resolving the license v. sale
conundrum that promotes a more expansive view of efficiency and brings
more predictability and fairness to an increasingly muddled area of the
law.
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and Lynne Dallas for their insights, comments, and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article,
Derek Diener for research assistance, and to Jasmine Vitug, Iryna Riechkina, and the other
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer a question that has become
increasingly more important as commerce moves from the tangible to
the intangible—to what extent may a business use a contract to control
the use of a fully paid product?
The past twenty years has seen a seismic shift in how businesses
distribute consumer goods, which may alter long-held expectations of
property ownership.1 Businesses often “license” rather than “sell”
their products and view consumers as licensees, rather than owners, of
the products they buy.2 Customers own their print copies of books,
movies, and music but merely license the same content when they
purchase it in digital form. Many products integrate licensed software
with tangible components and many, if not most, digital products are
characterized as “licensed, not sold.”3 License agreements restrict
consumers’ rights to use such goods. Consumers, however, may fail
to distinguish these licensed goods from those that they own.
Networked devices and home furnishings—the Internet of Things
(IOT)—are also likely to be licensed to consumers rather than sold
outright.4
The problems raised by the license v. sale dilemma have been the
subject of recent scholarly concern. Professors Aaron Perzanowski
and Jason Schultz summarize some of the consequences “for

1. See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 2 (2016) (“[D]igital retailers insist that
ownership depends on the terms of an end user license agreement . . . . Those terms—negotiated
by lawyers working for retailers and publishers—determine your rights, not the default entitlements
of personal property.”); JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW
DIGITAL SERFDOM 23 (2017) (“[W]hy did the development of online rights start turning the clock
backward to digital feudalism, rather than continuing the progress of traditional property rights into
new electronic markets? In short, courts and policymakers have struggled with how to apply
property law to things they can’t touch.”)
2. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 4.
3. Id.
4. For a comprehensive treatment of the legal and regulatory issues surrounding the IOT,
including the problem of post-purchase control by businesses, see STACY-ANN ELVY, A
COMMERCIAL LAW OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS (forthcoming
2021). See also Stacy-Ann Elvy, The Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods,
Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 82 (2017) [hereinafter Elvy, Hybrid
Transactions] (noting that the existing ambiguity in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) regarding hybrid transactions “becomes more pressing in the age of the Internet of Things
(IOT). Companies are increasingly adopting a software and service centric approach to the
development and sale of goods”).
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individuals and society” of shifting away from ownership toward a
“more conditional, impermanent access” to digital and physical goods:
So what is at stake when we make these choices? The most
immediate consequence of nonownership is the long list of
substantive rights we lose. . . . You can’t resell a product you
don’t own. You can’t lend it, give it away, or donate it. You
can’t read, watch, or listen on unapproved devices. You can’t
modify or repair the devices you use. . . . Nor is the impact
of the shift from ownership to licensing limited to
individuals; our educational and cultural institutions are
dealing with the fallout as well. When a library buys a printed
book, for example, it can lend it to as many patrons as it
chooses, without asking the publisher for permission of
paying additional fees. Library books can remain in
circulation for decades, serving the needs of hundreds of
readers. But when libraries acquire ebooks, licensing terms
and software code often impose hard ceilings on lending.5
Professor Joshua Fairfield issues an even starker warning, arguing that
the shift away from ownership will result in a new feudalism:
We must restore everyday property ownership. If we do not
take back our ownership rights from software companies and
overreaching governments, we will become digital peasants,
only able to use our smart devices, our homes, our cars, and
even our own software-enabled medical implants purely at
the whim of others. Like the serfs of feudal Europe who
lacked rights in the land they worked, without digital
property rights, we aren’t owners—we’re owned.6
It is more than the ability to consume and possess that is at stake. It is
the very ability to create. As Fairfield states, “[p]roperty provides
resources and tools. . . . to turn a technical legal right into a living
possibility.”7 The first sale right allows the buyer to transfer
possession of a good that was the subject of a first sale.8 If, however,
the good was licensed and not sold, the right of first sale would not
apply.9 Accordingly, those who own the digital rights to property
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 6.
FAIRFIELD, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 19.
Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1111.
Id.
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would be able to restrict how those who are merely licensees may use
them. As more goods are licensed and not sold, the goods available to
use in creative and productive pursuits diminish, further widening the
gap between the digital haves and have-nots.10
The license v. sale question also has ramifications for privacy.
Perzanowski and Schultz warn about the privacy problems associated
with licensed products, noting that there are laws that restrict access
to information associated with analog goods, such as the books library
patrons read or the movies that consumers rent, and make obtaining
such information burdensome.11 Digital transactions, however, make
tracking “far easier” and permit “unprecedented surveillance of
consumer behavior.”12 The ability to tie use of a product with the
collection of personal information depends upon whether the
transaction at issue is a license and not a sale.13 Companies that license
instead of sell goods will continue to have access and control to collect
information from the use of goods that consumers use in their homes
and in their cars. This is especially true where the product is
“tethered,” a term that Aaron Perzanowski, Chris Hoofnagle, and
Aniket Kesari use to refer to a product that has an “ongoing
connection” with its seller and that “often renders that good in some
way dependent on the seller for its ordinary operation. Such products
present as physical goods but often function as vessels for the delivery
of services.”14 IOT goods are tethered because their ongoing
functionality depends upon the seller’s service and constant updates
and modifications.15 Professor Stacy-Ann Elvy cautions that the IOT
has the potential to transform the advertisement and
marketing industry, and the data generated by IOT devices
could be used to target vulnerable consumers for contracting.
Goods can be made with a readable element in the packaging,
which will allow manufacturers to assess, in real time, the

10. This is not to suggest that the owner of a good acquires all rights to that good. The seller
would still retain intellectual property rights as discussed in Part III.D.
11. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 785
(2019).
15. Id. at 793.
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types of consumers who are buying and using their
products.16
These seismic changes have been taking place in the marketplace with
relatively little fanfare because, like privacy degradation, they are
gradual and intangible, involving no physical injuries or out-of-pocket
losses. Yet, like privacy, a lack of public outcry should not be equated
with public support or consent; nor does it mean that the changes are
socially beneficial. Joshua Fairfield warns,
If we are not cautious, the default rules of property, common
decency, and constitutional ordering that have been tested by
millions of people over generations will be discarded in favor
of a contract written by a corporate attorney in the last few
years to benefit her client and no one else. That is not going
to be a pleasant society to live in.17
I first tackled the license v. sale dilemma a decade ago.18 Since
then, the rapid proliferation of digital, networked products has raised
even more questions. Is the consumer restricted to the terms of the
license? Can he or she resell the device if he or she chooses to switch
to another brand? What if the device fails—is the consumer permitted
to seek repairs from unauthorized service providers or modify devices
to better suit his or her needs?
The Library of Congress attempted to answer the last question
regarding repairs when it adopted the Register of Copyright’s
Recommendation and ruled that the Digital Millennium
Circumvention Act’s prohibition on circumventing technological
measures that control access to copyright works (i.e., hacking) did not
apply to “noninfringing” uses of work, notably the ability to repair a
broken product.19 By weighing in on the important issue of whether
consumers could hack digital devices for the purpose of repairing
them, the Library of Congress sought to resolve a longstanding and
contentious issue. It was not entirely successful in doing so given that
at least certain provisions require that the “owner” of the device
initiate circumvention. For example, a subsection titled “Persons who
may initiate circumvention” states:
16. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC
and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 841 (2016) [hereinafter Elvy, Internet of Things].
17. FAIRFIELD, supra note 1, at 47.
18. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1112.
19. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(a)–(b) (2018).
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To the extent authorized under paragraph (b) of this section,
the circumvention of a technological measure that restricts
wireless telephone handsets or other wireless devices from
connecting to a wireless telecommunications network may
be initiated by the owner of any such handset or other device,
by another person at the direction of the owner, or by a
provider of a commercial mobile radio service or a
commercial mobile data service at the direction of such
owner or other person, solely in order to enable such owner
or a family member of such owner to connect to a wireless
telecommunications network, when such connection is
authorized by the operator of such network.20
It is unclear whether a licensee, as opposed to a purchaser, would be
considered the “owner” of a product. Furthermore, the right to repair
is limited and may not apply to the range of modifications that a
consumer may want to make, which may better suit his or her needs
and which may constitute enhancements and not repairs.21 If licensing,
rather than selling, becomes the predominant way by which goods are
transferred in a market economy, what will the future of innovation
look like if tinkerers are legally prohibited from altering the products
for which they pay? How will the environment be affected if products
cannot be reused, repaired or are made for a single user or use only?22
The marketplace transition from sale to license thus has far and
wide ripple effects affecting a range of issues from innovation to the
environment. The rapid emergence of the IOT adds to the urgency and
importance of the question—are goods licensed or sold?
Raising the stakes of the license v. sale dilemma even higher is
the problem of ubiquitous digital terms, what I refer to as “wrap
contracts,” as a shorthand for the myriad electronic adhesive form
contracts, such as browsewraps, clickwraps, and hybrid/sign-in
20. Id. § 201.40(c).
21. See Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the Right to
Repair, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 74 (2019) (proposing a theoretical framework for a right to repair
that is consistent with intellectual property laws).
22. The European Commission adopted a “Right to Repair” as part of its Circular Economy
Action Plan that aims to make the economy “fit for a green future, strengthen our competitiveness
while protecting the environment and give new rights to consumers.” This plan is not legislation
until and unless it is approved by European Union Member States and the European Parliament.
Changing How We Produce and Consume: New Circular Economy Action Plan Shows the Way to
a Climate-Neutral, Competitive Economy of Empowered Consumers, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 11,
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_420.
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wraps.23 Many customers are locked out of the devices they thought
they purchased until they agree to updated terms of services.24 These
terms may be updated frequently. Professor Lori Andrews describes
the experience of being locked out of her phone until she agreed to
Apple’s updated terms of service and being given only the alternative
of returning the phone (containing her precious photos, texts, and
music) for a refund if she refused.25
The problem of ubiquitous terms is exacerbated by the increasing
use of contracting agents, which removes the consumer from the
contracting process, resulting in what Stacy-Ann Elvy refers to as
“Contract Distancing”:
The device, rather than the consumer, places the order for the
goods, or the consumer places the order by clicking the Dash
Button. . . . The consumer is not required to access the
company’s website or mobile application (which contains
contract terms), review the company’s terms and conditions,
or click an “I agree” button before each subsequent order is
placed. This complicates the analysis of mutual assent, as
contract terms are not displayed on IOT devices. The ease
with which goods can be purchased using these devices
facilitates a contracting environment in which quick
purchases without contract review are the norm, thereby
further incentivizing consumers to fail to read and understand
contract terms. In turn, this encourages businesses to
continue to take advantage of consumer ignorance by
including one-sided contract terms that impede the ability of
consumers to obtain legal redress and may even lead to
contractual abuse.26
The United States Supreme Court raised the license v. sale issue
without resolving it in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark
International, Inc.27 (Impression), which held that a patentee’s
23. I have discussed the problem of wrap contracts at length elsewhere. See NANCY S. KIM,
WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 2 (2013).
24. See Lori Andrews, The Fragility of Consent, 66 LOY. L. REV. 11, 11 (2020).
25. Andrews writes, “Of course, returning the phone was not an option. My photos for the past
few years were on it, including the pictures of my younger sister before she died. The device also
housed my phone directory. . . . For me, it was as if someone was holding my possessions hostage,
asking me to give up basic human rights—like privacy—to get them back.” Id.
26. Elvy, Internet of Things, supra note 16, at 843–44.
27. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
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decision to sell a product subject to post-sale contract terms exhausted
all of its patent rights to that product regardless of whether the sale
occurred in the United States or abroad.28 The Patent Act grants a
patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention”29 so that anyone who does so without
authority infringes the patent.30 However, this right is subject to the
patent exhaustion doctrine, which limits the patentee’s rights so that
the first authorized sale of a patented item terminates the patentee’s
rights with respect to that item.31 The Supreme Court made a clear
distinction between a license and a sale with respect to post-sale
restrictions, stating:
A patentee can impose restrictions on licensees because a
license does not implicate the same concerns about restraints
on alienation as a sale. Patent exhaustion reflects the
principle that, when an item passes into commerce, it should
not be shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through
the marketplace. But a license is not about passing title to a
product, it is about changing the contours of the patentee’s
monopoly: The patentee agrees not to exclude a licensee
from making or selling the patented invention, expanding the
club of authorized producers and sellers.32
The Impression decision answers an important question regarding
the doctrine of patent exhaustion post-sale but pushes to the forefront
an equally perplexing and problematic question: Can a patentee
circumvent the patent exhaustion doctrine by licensing its products
rather than selling them? This seemingly simple question opens a
Pandora’s box of other issues relating to the license v. sale conundrum
because the classification of an item as a sale or license essentially
dictates the rights and remedies of the parties and determines which
regime of law governs.33
28. Id. at 1531.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018).
30. Id. § 271(a).
31. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1531.
32. Id. at 1534.
33. If the transaction is a sale, article 2 of the UCC, consumer protection laws, and the common
law of contracts govern the transaction. Although article 2 of the UCC covers transactions in goods,
relevant provisions of the UCC refer to “sales” or “sellers.” Consumer protection laws typically
apply to sales or leases of consumer goods. For example, the warranty protection provided under
the California consumer protection law, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, applies to the
“sale of consumer goods.” CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790–1795.8 (Deering 2020). The Song-Beverly
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At the heart of the license v. sale conundrum is contract law. The
characterization of a transaction determines what may be done with
the product, who controls how the product may be used, and what
happens in the event of a dispute.34 A contract may contain terms that
determine how the transaction is characterized. Accordingly, contracts
have the potential to alter consumer expectations in a profound way.
For example, if a consumer pays for a television, he or she may expect
to be able to later resell it or give it away when he or she no longer has
a use for it. But could a consumer do so if, prior to purchase, he or she
had agreed to contractual terms that stated that he or she was not the
owner of the television, but a mere licensee? What if those terms were
contained in the box that contained the television when the consumer
purchased it—and never read them? Mass consumer contracting and
the transfer, or retention, of rights through adhesive forms lack the
signaling effects of negotiated and signed paper contracts. The
proliferation of digital contracting, lack of consumer awareness, and
the adhesive nature of standard form contracts raise important policy
concerns regarding whether there should be constraints on the ability
to license, rather than sell, goods in mass consumer transactions.
Because both the UCC and intellectual property regimes defer to
the power of contracts to reallocate rights,35 a circularity problem
arises: if the transaction is a license instead of a sale, the terms of the
contract govern, including any terms that prohibit selling the product;

Act defines “sale” as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price” or “a consignment
for sale.” Id. § 1791(n)(1)–(2). On the other hand, if the transaction is a license, intellectual property
law (specifically copyright and patent law) govern. Kim, supra note 8, at 1110–11. For further
discussion, see Elvy, Hybrid Transactions, supra note 4, at 79, where the author noted that “one of
the thorniest issues in sale of goods transactions is how best to determine whether Article 2 applies
to transactions involving the provision of goods and no-goods, such as services or software.” See
also Kim, supra note 8, at 1110 (stating that the “ramifications of characterizing software
transactions as either license or sales are manifold” and “has a domino effect on the applicable
regulatory regime, default rules, and available remedies”); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 14, at 794–
95 (observing that “[s]oftware licensing has blended elements of the sale of goods and the provision
of services” and “straddle accepted legal categories,” and “courts struggle to conceptualize these
transactions”).
34. Elvy notes that companies may avoid the application of article 2 of the UCC “by providing
different agreements that govern the device’s hardware, software and services.” Elvy, Hybrid
Transactions, supra note 4, at 85.
35. Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim only if the work is within the
subject matter of copyright and the right being asserted is equivalent to “any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2018); see also Forest Park Pictures v.
Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that a contract claim
is not preempted if there is an “extra element” that differs from the copyright infringement claim).
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however, the contract itself may determine whether the transaction is
characterized as a license or sale. Owners of tangible property have
the power to restrict the use of their property, but their power to do so
is tied to their ownership. Generally, if the transaction is characterized
as a sale, then the seller’s property rights are terminated. By contrast,
a license allows the owner of intangible property to retain rights with
respect to it even if it is integrated with tangible property that has been
sold. This is the case in an increasing number of transactions that
cannot be easily characterized as exclusively a license or a sale. Rather
these license-sale transactions are a hybrid of both; the tangible
component or medium is sold, but the digital content or intellectual
property right associated with the product is licensed.36
This Article argues that the enforceability of contract terms in a
license-sale transaction depends upon two factors: first, whether the
terms affect the “sold” portion or the “licensed” portion; and second,
whether the contract is formed pre- or post-sale. A contract cannot
recharacterize a sale as a license after the transaction has occurred, but
it can impose restrictions that may define or characterize that
transaction if those restrictions are agreed to before the transaction has
occurred.
Unfortunately, contract doctrine in the past three decades has
adopted a narrow version of efficiency that confuses efficiency with
facilitating transactions and accordingly, substitutes constructive
assent with constructive notice. But contracts that significantly alter
the parties’ rights must reflect the intent of the parties. More
transactions with hidden, unread, and unfair terms are suboptimal, do
not leave the parties (or society) better off, and cannot be justified by
any economic theory. A contract that contains terms that purport to

36. In order to avoid confusion with hybrid transactions under the UCC (where the term is
used by courts to refer to transactions that involve the sale of goods and services), I will refer to
transactions that involve the sale of a tangible component with the license of an intangible
component as a “license-sale” and will eschew the use of the term “hybrid” transaction. See
generally Elvy, Hybrid Transactions, supra note 4, at 104–35 (providing an extensive discussion
of hybrid transactions, including whether software constitute goods or services, and the different
tests employed by courts to determine whether the UCC applies). The determination of whether an
offering is a “good” or “service” is important for purposes of the UCC; however, this Article
focuses on the license v. sale conundrum that affects the application of the UCC but also other laws,
significantly, the first sale doctrine. All transactions involving tethered goods under my definition
would be considered license-sale transactions, but not all license-sale transactions involve tethered
goods. Some involve products that involve no ongoing relationship between the buyer and the
seller, yet the seller purports in a contract to maintain rights to that product.
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transform what would otherwise be a sale into a license alters the
buyer’s first sale rights and requires scrutiny, especially when that
contract is presented as a non-negotiated, mass consumer form.37
The question of whether a product is licensed or sold is too often
conflated with the question of whether a product should be licensed or
sold. The normative question typically arises in assessing the issue of
infringement; however, the normative question must be disentangled
from the descriptive question regarding whether a given transaction is
in fact a license or a sale. This Article proposes a methodology for
resolving the license v. sale conundrum that promotes a more
expansive view of efficiency by bringing more clarity and fairness to
an increasingly muddled area of the law.
Part II provides essential background and identifies the stakes
involved in the license v. sale conundrum. Part III analyzes the pivotal
role of contract law in assessing the nature of post-transaction
restrictions. Part IV proposes a methodology for assessing whether a
good is “licensed” or “sold.” This Article concludes that the license v.
sale conundrum is a problem created by contract law that can be
resolved by contract law that focuses on the reasonable expectations
of the parties.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING
PRODUCTS “LICENSED, NOT SOLD”
This Part II provides an overview of the current law governing
the license v. sale dilemma. Generally, the relevant cases addressed
one or both of the following two issues: (i) whether a post-sale contract
may restrict first sale rights and (ii) whether contractual language
characterizes a transaction as a license or a sale.
A. A First Sale Exhausts a Patentee’s Rights Despite Post-Sale
Terms
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,38 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of post-sale restrictions on use and held that
the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to method patents and the
sale of components that embody them.39 In that case, LG Electronics
(LGE) licensed its patents to Intel pursuant to a License Agreement
37. See discussion infra Part III.
38. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
39. Id. at 621.
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that permitted “Intel to ‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer
to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ its own products practicing the
LGE patents.”40 The License Agreement also stated that no license
was granted to “any third party” for the combination of other
components with the licensed products. 41 Notably, it also stated,
“[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit
or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply
when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.”42
LGE and Intel signed a separate agreement, the Master
Agreement, which required that Intel provide written notice to its
customers that Intel products, which were licensed by LGE, did not
“extend, expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by
combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.”43 The Master
Agreement also provided that “a breach of this Agreement shall have
no effect on and shall not be grounds for termination of the Patent
License.”44 Quanta purchased microprocessors and chips from Intel.45
Intel had given Quanta the notice required by the Master Agreement,
but Quanta manufactured computers using Intel components
combined with non-Intel components.46 It did not alter or modify the
Intel components but incorporated them into its own systems.47 LGE
sued Quanta, claiming that its use was infringing upon LGE patents.48
Patent exhaustion is triggered only by an authorized sale, and LGE
argued that the sale of the Intel components was not authorized
because the License Agreement did not permit Intel to sell its products
for use in combination with non-Intel products in a way that practiced
the LGE patents.49 The U.S. Supreme Court looked at the structure of
the transaction to determine whether the sale was “authorized.”50 It
stated:

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 636–37.
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Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to
sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who
intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. . . . In any
event, the provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only
in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a
breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the
License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its
products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on
the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s
directions in that notice.51
The Court further noted that the disclaimer of a third-party license
in the License Agreement was “irrelevant” to the issue of exhaustion
since exhaustion turns on an authorized first sale and not on an implied
license.52 It concluded that because “[n]o conditions limited Intel’s
authority to sell products substantially embodying the patents,” its
sales to Quanta were authorized, which triggered patent exhaustion.53
Accordingly, LGE could no longer assert its patent rights against
Quanta.54
Although the Quanta case involved a negotiated agreement, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of post-sale terms in an
adhesive form contract in a later case, Impression. Lexmark, a
manufacturer of toner cartridges, offered its products at two different
prices—one at full price and the other at a 20 percent discount through
its “Return Program.”55 The company required that customers
purchasing its Return Program cartridges agreed that they would use
the cartridge only once and would not transfer the empty cartridge to
any party other than Lexmark.56 In addition, Lexmark installed a
microchip on each Return Program cartridge to prevent its reuse.57
Companies, however, soon found ways to circumvent the microchip
and resell the Return Program cartridges.58 Lexmark sued several of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id.
Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2017).
Id. at 1529–30.
Id. at 1530.
Id.
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these “remanufacturers” and eventually settled with all but
Impression.59
Lexmark argued that Impression infringed Lexmark’s patents
when Impression refurbished and resold Lexmark’s cartridges in
express violation of the agreement between Lexmark and its
customers.60 Impression also acquired cartridges from purchasers
overseas and imported them into the United States, which Lexmark
claimed infringed its patent because it had never permitted their
importation.61 Impression, however, argued that Lexmark’s sales of its
cartridges exhausted its patent rights so that Impression was free to
refurbish, resell and—for those cartridges acquired abroad—import
them.62
The Supreme Court agreed with Impression, ruling that “a
patentee’s decision to sell a product exhaust[ed] all of its patent rights
in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to
impose or the location of the sale.”63 This was the case even if the sale
had been made by a licensee and not the patentee itself; if the
licensee’s customers signed a contract agreeing to restrict their use of
the product, “the sale nonetheless exhausts all patent rights in the item
sold.”64 The Court alluded to the possibility of a contract remedy in
that situation, stating that if the purchaser did not comply with the use
restriction, “the only recourse for the licensee is through contract law,
just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction.”65
The Court distinguished another case, General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,66 which involved a licensee who
knowingly made sales unauthorized by its license.67 It characterized

59. Id. (“Eventually, the lawsuit was whittled down to one defendant, Impression Products,
and one defense: that Lexmark’s sales, both in the United States and abroad, exhausted its patent
rights in the cartridges, so Impression Products was free to refurbish and resell them, and to import
them if acquired abroad.”); Michele Korkhov & Anna Marienko, Impression Products v. Lexmark
International, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/15-1189 (last visited
Dec. 17, 2020) (“In 2010, Lexmark sued Impression Products and several other re-manufacturers
for direct and contributory patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. The only defendant
remaining in this case is Impression Products.”)
60. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1530.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1529.
64. Id. at 1535.
65. Id.
66. 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
67. Id. at 126.

(7) 54.1_KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

114

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/25/21 5:56 PM

[Vol. 54:99

that case as standing for the “modest principle that, if a patentee has
not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot
exhaust the patentee’s rights.”68 The Impression opinion differentiated
authorized sales from unauthorized ones, noting that, ‘[o]nce a
patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—
that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale
restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through
a license.”69 Accordingly, a patentee could not use licenses to impose
post-sale restraints upon purchasers.70
The Impression decision clarified that a patentee who sells a
product could not enforce a contractual reuse or resale restriction with
an infringement lawsuit. In doing so, the Court rejected a significant
Federal Circuit court decision, Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart Inc.,71
which permitted post-sale use restrictions of a patented item.72 In
Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit held that a “single use only”
restriction was enforceable even after the first sale of the item.73 The
Supreme Court in Impression stated that the Federal Circuit had “got
off on the wrong foot” by relying upon Mallinckrodt.74 The Federal
Circuit believed that the exhaustion doctrine was a presumption about
the authority of the purchaser to use a patented item; thus, that
presumption would be inapplicable if the patentee withheld some of
rights to use the item.75 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
patent exhaustion is “not a presumption about the authority that comes
along with a sale; it is instead a limit on the ‘scope of the patentee’s
rights.’”76
Furthermore, the Court made clear that its analysis applied to
copyright as well as patent first sale, stating that “differentiating the
patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines would make little
theoretical or practical sense: The two share a ‘strong similarity . . .
and identity of purpose.’”77 The Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine
68. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1535.
69. Id. at 1535.
70. Id. at 1534–35.
71. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
72. Id. at 709.
73. Id.
74. Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1533.
75. Id. at 1533–34 (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 734,
742, rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017)).
76. Id. at 1534 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)).
77. Id. at 1536 (quoting Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913)).
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permits “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made . . . without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”78
The Impression case limits the patentee’s ability to control the
purchaser’s use of a product post-sale. The Court also clearly indicated
that the case was not limited to patent first sale, but also applied to
copyright first sale, thus implicating a much wider swath of goods and
services.79
Impression involved a product that was sold and one that did not
contain licensed components. Significantly, the Supreme Court
decision applied only to post-sale restrictions. The Supreme Court
suggested that patent exhaustion may not apply to situations where a
patented item was distributed pursuant to a license, or where the sale
was unauthorized, as in General Talking Pictures.80 Consequently, the
case did not resolve the fundamental question regarding whether (and
to what extent) owners could use a contract to shape the nature of the
rights they transferred. The significance and future impact of
Impression may be greatly limited if a patentee (or copyright holder)
is permitted to achieve through licensing what it could not through a
sale.
Impression was a case about patent exhaustion and international
sales, so the Supreme Court only glossed over the contract issues.
Those contract issues were squarely confronted in a different case that
also involved Lexmark and a contractual prohibition against the reuse
of cartridge. In Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Association Inc.
v. Lexmark International Inc.,81 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the validity of Lexmark’s “Prebate” program contract.82
Lexmark required its customers to select one of two types of printer
cartridges.83 Apparently the only differentiating factor between the
two was that the Prebate cartridges cost less and contained terms that
purported to restrict the consumers’ use of the cartridge.84 The
78. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
79. See Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 1536.
80. Id. at 1538. See generally Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124
(1938).
81. 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 984–85. The “Prebate” program was later renamed the Return Program. See Lexmark
Int’l., Inc. v. Ink Tech. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL 1276133, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 27, 2014), rev’d, 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
83. Arizona Cartridge, 421 F.3d at 983–84.
84. Id.
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customer did not sign an actual contract; rather, the terms were printed
across the top of the cartridge box so that the customer could not avoid
seeing them.85 The terms stated that the customer accepted them by
opening the package; rejecting the terms required returning the
unopened package to the place of purchase. 86 The plaintiffs, who
remanufactured printer cartridges for reuse, sued Lexmark claiming
that it engaged in deceptive and unfair business practices when it told
customers that they had to honor the post-sale restrictions on the
cartridge package.87 The plaintiffs argued that Lexmark could only
impose such a restriction with a valid contract, which the Prebate
contract was not.88
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s
finding of enforceability.89 In addressing the validity of the contract,
the court cited California Commercial Code, which adopted the UCC
provision, which permits a contract to be formed “in any manner
sufficient to show agreement . . . . even though the moment of its
making is undetermined.”90 Interestingly, in a footnote, the court of
appeals stated that its holding did not “preclude challenges to the
contract” which could be raised by a customer who was a party to the
contract—which the plaintiffs were not.91
B. The Nature of the Restrictions Distinguishes a License from a
Sale
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the presence of Silicon Valley and
Hollywood within its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has been
particularly active in hearing cases involving the license v. sale
quandary in the context of copyright first sale.
In the first significant Ninth Circuit case on this topic, United
States v. Wise,92 the defendant operated a business which sold
copyrighted feature-length motion picture and prints.93 The movie
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 984.
88. Id. at 987.
89. Id. at 988 (reasoning that consumers “(1) have notice of the condition, (2) have a chance
to reject the contract on that basis and (3) receive consideration in the form of a reduced price in
exchange for the limits placed on reuse of the cartridge”).
90. CAL. COM. CODE § 2204(1) (Deering 2020).
91. Arizona Cartridge, 421 F.3d at 988 n.8.
92. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. Id. at 1183.
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studios that owned the copyright to the films did not sell them but
licensed their use for limited purposes and for limited periods of time
to movie theatres, airlines, private groups and members of the motion
picture industry.94 The license agreements pursuant to which these
films were distributed generally reserved title in the studios and
contained restrictions, including their return after the expiration of the
license period, prohibition on copying of the prints, and, in some
cases, limiting the print to personal use.95 The court stated that with
respect to the films that were the subject of the agreements, “[n]one of
the films had been subject to an outright sale,”96 meaning there was no
payment in exchange for the films.
The court noted that before the first sale doctrine could be applied,
a “transfer of title” must have occurred rather than “mere
possession.”97 In determining whether the transactions were “sales”
for purposes of the first sale doctrine, the court considered several
factors, including their designation as licenses, the purported transfer
of only limited rights for a limited purpose and period of time, the
reservation of title in the studio, prohibitions on copying, and the
requirement of return at the end of the contract term.98 It concluded
that most of the contracts “were consistent with the theory of a limited
license and inconsistent with the concept of a sale.”99 The court took
special note of two agreements with similar provisions. The first
agreement contained a provision that “Licensor may buy from NBC”
prints made at a mutually agreed upon price; if no price was reached,
NBC agreed to destroy the prints.100 It also contained a provision that
the licensor retained title to the prints.101 The court concluded that the
agreement indicated that the transaction was a license and not a sale.102
The court came to a different conclusion with respect to the second
agreement (that was not labeled as a license) because although it also
contained a provision regarding the return of prints, it contained no
provision regarding the retention of title by the licensor.103 More
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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importantly, it contained a provision that “[a]t ABC’s election and cost
a file-screening copy shall be retained.”104 The court found that the
provision “clearly contemplates the sale of a film print to ABC at
ABC’s election.”105 Prints that were loaned to actors subject to
agreements that contained personal use restrictions, prohibited
copying, and reserved rights to the studio were also considered
licenses, not sales.106 An exception was an agreement between Warner
Brothers and the actress, Vanessa Redgrave.107 That agreement
provided that Redgrave would pay for the print but contained a
provision that the print was for her “personal use and enjoyment” only,
must remain in her possession, could not be “sold, leased, licensed or
loaned,” and could not be reproduced.108 The court stated that while
the payment provision alone did not establish a sale, together with the
rest of the agreement, the transaction “strongly” resembled a sale with
use restrictions.109
The Ninth Circuit revisited the license v. sale issue in three cases
often referred to as the “MAI trio,” which involved whether
customized software was licensed or sold for the purposes of the
essential step defense under the Copyright Act.110 The essential step
defense permits the owner of a copy of a software program to make a
copy of a program as an “essential step in the utilization of the
computer program” or for “archival purposes.”111 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished a license from a sale based upon the nature of the
restrictions imposed by the agreement.112 If the agreement imposed
significant restrictions, the software was deemed licensed and not
sold.113 Accordingly, the first sale doctrine did not apply. The MAI trio

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1192.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys.
Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)–(2) (2018); see also Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that an owner may copy software as an essential step in using the program).
112. See Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 785; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1337; MAI Sys. Corp.,
991 F.2d at 517.
113. See Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 785; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1333; MAI Sys. Corp.,
991 F.2d at 517.
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became the foundation upon which the Ninth Circuit decided a spate
of subsequent cases in 2010 and 2011.
In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,114 Vernor purchased used copies of
Autodesk’s software and resold them on eBay.115 He sought a
declaratory judgment that by doing so, he was not infringing upon
Autodesk’s copyright.116 The district court agreed, holding that
“Vernor’s sales were lawful” under “the first sale doctrine and the
essential step defense” of the Copyright Act.117 The Ninth Circuit,
however, disagreed, holding that a software user is a licensee rather
than the owner of a copy where the copyright owner “(1) specifies that
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability
to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”118
In a subsequent case, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,119 the
Ninth Circuit noted the distinction between a transfer of title and
transfer of possession—and hinted that software may be different from
other goods.120 That case involved promotional music compact discs
(CDs) distributed by the music company, UMG.121 The CDs were
distributed without seeking payment.122 Some of the CDs contained a
statement indicating that the license was for personal use only,
prohibiting transfer or resale, and stating that acceptance of the CD
constituted acceptance of the terms of the “license.”123 Other CDs
simply contained a “Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale” label.124
UMG did not send Augusto the CDs, but he managed to acquire them
and then sold them online.125 UMG sued, alleging copyright
infringement.126 Augusto argued that the first sale doctrine permitted
him to sell or transfer the CDs without permission from UMG.127
UMG argued that the first sale doctrine did not apply because the
promotional statement meant that the recipients were licensees and not
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
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owners of the CDs.128 The court disagreed, stating that
“[n]otwithstanding its distinctive name, the [first sale] doctrine applies
not only when a copy is first sold, but when a copy is given away or
title is otherwise transferred without the accouterments of a sale.”129
The court, citing its decisions in Vernor and the MAI trio, noted
that “[p]articularly with regard to computer software” a transfer of
possession of a copy did not necessarily entail a transfer of title.130
However, UMG did not keep track of the CDs and entitled the
recipients to use or dispose of them as they liked.131 Significantly,
under 39 U.S.C. § 3009, the CDs were unordered merchandise and the
recipients had the right to treat them as gifts without any obligation to
the sender.132 Because the recipients of the CDs could transfer them
under the federal statute, they were owners and not licensees for
purposes of the first sale defense.133 According to the court, the effect
of the unordered merchandise statute distinguished the case from
Vernor and the MAI trio.134
The court noted that other factors weighed against finding a
license. The “Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale” restriction did not
identify itself as a license.135 Even the longer notice was insufficient
in the court’s view.136 That version stated as follows:
This CD is the property of the record company and is
licensed to the intended recipient for personal use only.
Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an agreement to
comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of
possession is not allowed and may be punishable under
federal and state laws.137
Interestingly, the court did not mention another case, MDY
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,138 which was argued

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1180.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1180–81.
133. Id. at 1181.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1182.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). Both UMG Recordings and Blizzard were argued and
submitted on June 7, 2010.
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on the same day before the Ninth Circuit.139 MDY developed and sold
a software program that automatically played the early levels of the
popular role-playing computer game, World of Warcraft (WoW).140
Citing Vernor, the Ninth Circuit held that WoW players were licensees
because Blizzard reserved title in the software, granted players a nonexclusive limited license, and imposed significant transfer and use
restrictions.141
Finally, in F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records,142 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether iTunes downloads were
licensed or sold.143 In 1998, the parties entered into a contract that
required F.B.T. to transfer the exclusive rights to the musician
Eminem’s recordings to Aftermath.144 In a contractual provision that
the parties referred to as the “Records Sold provision,” the parties
agreed that Aftermath was to pay F.B.T. 12 to 20 percent of the
adjusted retail price for all “full price records sold in the United
States . . . through normal retail channels.”145 Another provision,
which the parties referred to as the “Masters Licensed” provision,
stated that “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing,” Aftermath would pay
F.B.T. “50% of Aftermath’s net receipts ‘[o]n masters licensed by us
. . . to others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any other
uses.’”146 In 2002, Aftermath entered into an agreement with Apple,
which allowed the Eminem masters to be sold as permanent
downloads through the iTunes store.147 Aftermath entered into other
contracts with cell phone carriers to sell ringtones.148 After a 2006
139. See id. at 929; UMG Recordings, Inc., 628 F.3d at 1175.
140. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 934–35.
141. For example, if a player transferred the license, the player must transfer all packaging,
permanently delete the game client, and transfer only to someone willing to accept the end user
license agreement. The software was only for non-commercial use and Blizzard was able to
remotely alter the game client and terminate the license in the event the terms were violated.
Termination of the license required the immediate destruction of all copies of the game and the
removal of the game client from computers. Id. at 938–39.
142. 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
143. Id. at 961.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 961.
146. Id. (alterations in original).
147. Id. at 962. The agreement was actually between Aftermath’s parent company and Apple.
Aftermath’s parent company, UMG Recordings, Inc., was also a defendant in the lawsuit. For the
sake of simplicity, I will refer to the defendants as Aftermath.
148. In 2003, F.B.T. and Aftermath entered into a new agreement that replaced the 1998
agreement. The 2003 agreement retained the wording of the 1998 contract with respect to the
royalty rates for records and masters. The parties amended the agreement in 2004 to include a
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audit showed that Aftermath had been calculating permanent
downloads under the Records Sold provision (with a royalty rate of 12
to 20 percent of the adjusted retail price), F.B.T. sued, arguing that the
applicable royalty rate should be that specified under the Masters
Licensed provision (50 percent of net receipts).149 Aftermath argued
that the permanent downloads should be calculated pursuant to the
Records Sold provision.150
In order to determine whether the Masters Licensed provision
applied, the court had to decide whether Aftermath licensed the
Eminem masters.151 The Ninth Circuit noted the distinction between
license and sale under federal copyright law:
When one looks to the Copyright Act, the terms “license”
and “sale” have well differentiated meanings, and the
differences between the two play an important role in the
overall structures and policies that govern artistic rights. For
example, under the language of the Act and the Supreme
Court’s interpretations, a “sale” of a work may either be a
transfer in title of an individual copy of a work, or a sale of
all exclusive intellectual property rights in a work.152
It concluded that Aftermath “did not ‘sell’ anything” to Apple and
other download distributors because the distributors “did not obtain
title to the digital files.”153 On the contrary, Aftermath retained the
digital files, reserved the right to regain possession of them, and
obtained recurring payments based on the volume of downloads.154 It
added that under Ninth Circuit cases interpreting and applying federal
copyright law, including the MAI trio, “where a copyright owner
transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title, limits the uses to
which the material may be put, and is compensated periodically based
on the transferee’s exploitation of the material, the transaction is a
license.”155

provision that “Sales of Albums by way of permanent download shall be treated as [U.S. Normal
Retail Channel] Net Sales for the purposes of escalations.” Id. (alteration in original).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 964.
152. Id. at 964–65.
153. Id. at 965.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit implicitly acknowledged a difference between
the permanent downloads, which remained on the end user’s computer
and were “sold,” and the masters, which were “licensed.”156 It stated
that the agreement between Apple and Aftermath enabled the Eminem
masters “to be sold” as permanent downloads.157 It wrote that the
agreement was one of several that Aftermath entered into to “sell
sound recordings in digital formats” and to “sell sound recordings as
mastertones.”158
These Ninth Circuit cases do not provide a bright-line test but set
forth criteria to assess whether a transfer of physical possession or a
grant of access to a copyrighted item is a license or a sale.159
Contractual language identifying the transaction as a license instead
of a sale is helpful but not determinative; what is crucial is when the
contract was presented and the nature of the restrictive provisions.
Part III delves further into the swirl of contractual issues involved in
license-sale transactions.
III. CONTRACTUAL ISSUES AT THE HEART OF THE LICENSE V. SALE
DILEMMA
As this Part III explains, the license v. sale question requires (i)
determining whether the agreement was properly formed and (ii)
assessing whether the licensing restrictions are drafted as conditions
or covenants.
A. Adhesive Forms to Protect Self-Replicating Innovations
As previously discussed, an adhesive contract may be formed
after the acts typically constituting the transaction have been
performed. At least in some cases, a rolling contract (also known as a
“pay-first-terms-later”) is used to prevent opportunistic160 buyers from
knowingly exploiting a product in ways that diminish economic gains

156. Id. at 962.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See also Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32, 45 (2d Cir.
2019) (noting that MSEI was an owner of the station and server source code because it was not
restricted from “discarding or disposing of the software as it wished”).
160. I use the term “opportunistic” to mean that the buyer is acting in a way that it knows the
seller does not approve in order to obtain a benefit that was not part of the express bargain between
the parties.
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for the seller and deter future innovation.161 The problem of
opportunism looms large for businesses that have invested substantial
resources in creating a product.
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of opportunism’s
effect on innovation in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,162 a case involving
Roundup Ready soybean seeds that were genetically modified to resist
glyphosate-based herbicides.163 Monsanto invented and patented
Roundup Ready seeds and sold them to growers subject to a licensing
agreement.164 The agreement allowed a grower to plant the seeds only
for one season.165 The grower could consume or sell the crop, but it
could not save any harvested soybeans for replanting.166 The
restriction prevented growers from producing their own Roundup
Ready seed, which would force them to repurchase the seeds each
season. 167 Bowman purchased Roundup Ready seeds every year for
his first crop of the season.168 He complied with the terms of the
agreement, using the seeds for planting once and then selling his crop
to a grain elevator.169 For the second crop of the season, however,
Bowman purchased soybean seeds from a grain elevator, which were
cheaper than the premium price of the Roundup Ready seeds.170 The
supply from the grain elevator contained a mix of seeds, and Bowman
surmised they included Roundup Ready seeds from local farmers’
prior harvests.171 Bowman sprayed a glyphosate-based herbicide on
his crops, and the surviving plants produced the genetically modified

161. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing?, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH .
123, 129–30 (2017) (noting four “facts of life” about innovation markets: “First, an innovation
cannot earn a positive return unless it is embedded in a viable product delivered at a competitive
cost to market. Second, successful commercialization requires that some entity place at risk
significant capital and expertise. Third, the innovator is often not the individual or entity best suited
to undertake the commercialization process. Fourth, in the vast majority of cases, any IP-protected
asset faces competition from actual or potential substitutes, in which case it is the market, not the
IP holder, that sets the terms of exchange . . . .”). The first two factors tend to be the most relevant
considerations in assessing the effect of opportunism on innovation.
162. 569 U.S. 278 (2013).
163. Id. at 280–81.
164. Id. at 281.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 281–82.
170. Id. at 282.
171. Id.
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Roundup Ready seeds.172 He replanted the seeds and grew more crops
producing Roundup Ready seeds.173 When Monsanto learned what
Bowman was doing, it sued on the grounds of patent infringement.174
Bowman raised the defense of patent exhaustion, claiming that the
seeds were the product of a prior authorized sale.175 The Federal
Circuit rejected Bowman’s argument and the Supreme Court
affirmed.176
The Supreme Court decision in Monsanto did not resolve the
license v. sale issue even though that issue is arguably the most
significant one looming over the case. The Court addressed the license
agreement only in passing, noting that it gave the purchaser the right
to plant the seed and harvest and market one crop of beans.177 The
Court employed the language of “sale” when referring to the
transaction, but one that required compliance with the terms of a
“license agreement.”178 In other words, the transaction involved the
sale of a licensed product. Accordingly, the licensed product should
be subject to the first sale doctrine, meaning that Monsanto’s patent
rights terminated with respect to that item.179 Ordinarily, this poses no
problem. A buyer who purchases a patented item may resell that
specific item, but it may not make that item (or a duplicate) and sell it.
The Monsanto case, however, involved a self-replicating product.180
The Court stated that the patent exhaustion doctrine only applied to
the item sold and did not affect the patentee’s right to prevent a
purchaser from making new copies of the patented item.181
Accordingly, the patent exhaustion doctrine did not permit the
purchaser to recreate or construct a new product.182 The Court

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 282–83.
176. Id. at 283.
177. Id. at 285 n.3.
178. Id.
179. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates
all patent rights to that item.”).
180. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 1, at 163 (discussing the problem of selfreplicating technologies and the Bowman v. Monsanto case, observing that “patent exhaustion has
also been complicated by technological advances, and in particular technologies where
reproduction or replication is simple or even self-executing”).
181. Bowman, 569 U.S. at 284.
182. Id.
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concluded that, by replanting the seeds and growing plants from which
he could harvest additional patented soybeans, Bowman was
“making” Monsanto’s patented invention.183 It reasoned that any other
conclusion would provide Monsanto with “scant benefit,” in that, after
receiving payment for the initial sales of its Roundup Ready seeds,
growers could simply reproduce the seed themselves.184 Monsanto
would not profit from its investment in the seeds, undermining the
incentive for innovation, which is the objective of the Patent Act.185
Bowman knew what the conditions of sale were, valued Monsanto’s
invention, received the benefit from the invention, and yet, “devised a
less orthodox approach” because he “did not want to pay the premium
price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed.”186 In other
words, in the Court’s view, Bowman was an opportunistic buyer, and
his opportunism threatened the economic investment in innovation
made by Monsanto.187
An opportunistic buyer threatened a business’s investment in a
reproducible innovation in an earlier, and possibly even more
consequential, case. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg188 had nothing to do
with patent exhaustion but caused a seismic change in the way courts
viewed assent to standard form contracts. ProCD created a computer
database containing information from thousands of telephone
directories.189 It made two versions of the software, one for sale to the
trade and the other, which was lower-priced, for sale to the general
public for personal use.190 The software package that was sold to the
general public contained a shrinkwrap license agreement, which
restricted use of the software for “non-commercial purposes” only.191
Matthew Zeidenberg purchased a package of ProCD software.192
Despite knowing that the agreement prohibited it, he formed a
company to copy and sell copies of the software on his own website
at a lower price than ProCD itself charged.193 ProCD sued to enforce
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 285.
See id. at 285–87.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 287.
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1449.
Id.
Id. at 1450.
Id.
Id.
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the contract.194 Zeidenberg argued that because the terms were
contained in the box, and inaccessible until after the purchase was
completed, the agreement did not bind him.195 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that Zeidenberg had notice that
terms governed the transaction prior to purchase and, after purchase,
he had an opportunity to read the terms. Accordingly, he would be
deemed to have accepted the terms if he failed to return the
software.196
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion focused on Zeidenberg’s
opportunism and the way that it detrimentally affected ProCD’s ability
to capitalize on its investment. Zeidenberg was fully aware of the
restrictions on copying; he not only chose to ignore them, but he
created a company to exploit and profit from ProCD’s investment.197
Zeidenberg paid only $150 for each set of five discs. 198 By contrast,
ProCD had invested more than $10 million to compile and maintain
the software.199 The court noted that ProCD engaged in a price
differentiation strategy that ultimately benefited consumers.200
Arguably, ProCD helped foster the development of mass consumer
software products by creating a precedent that provided greater
protection for a business’s investment in innovation from
opportunistic purchasers.
Unfortunately, ProCD also upended the existing law of contract
formation and paved the way for opportunism, this time from
businesses with the power to draft adhesive contracts with one-sided
terms. Rolling contracts, such as the one in ProCD, are generally
understood to be contractual terms that are attached to a transaction
after the acts typically associated with the transaction have been
completed.201 They are generally enforceable if there was notice of

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1452 (“ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software
after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.”).
197. Id. at 1450.
198. Id. at 1449.
199. Id.
200. Id. (“If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price—
that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public—it would have
to raise the price substantially over $150.”).
201. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002)
(describing a rolling contract as one where the “consumer orders and pays for goods before seeing
most of the terms, which are contained on or in the packaging of the goods”).
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terms prior to the transaction and an opportunity to reject them after
the transaction. For example, Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications
America, LLC202 involved a brochure containing an arbitration
agreement that was contained within a box and that could not be
accessed without opening the package after purchase.203 The court in
that case concluded that silence could not constitute acceptance where
nothing on the outside of the packaging indicated that opening the box
meant acceptance of terms contained in the box.204 By contrast, the
court in Arizona Cartridge, found consumers accepted license terms
printed on the outside of a printer cartridge box by opening it.205
B. The Importance of Specific Language in Contract Formation
Because some wrap contracts,206 such as browsewraps and
shrinkwraps, are unsigned, their formation depends on whether the
recipient manifested assent after receiving reasonable notice. Precise
wording may determine whether a contract was validly formed and
thus, whether the license terms are binding. In Disney Enterprises, Inc.
v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC,207 the court emphasized the
language of reasonable notice.208 Disney offered films on “Combo
Packs,” which contained a Blu-Ray disc, a digital versatile disc
(DVD), and a piece of paper with an alphanumeric code.209 The code,
which could be redeemed at RedeemDigitalMovies.com or DisneyM
oviesAnywhere.com, permitted the user to stream and download the
movie.210 On the outside and bottom third of the Combo Pack box, the
print stated, “Codes are not for sale or transfer.”211 In “[v]ery fine
202. 845 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2017).
203. Id. at 1281–82.
204. Id. at 1287.
205. Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 987–88
(9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, the court stated that customers were provided consideration in the
form of a reduced price. Id. at 985.
206. Wrap contract is the general term I use to refer to shrinkwraps, clickwraps, browsewraps,
and other contract forms that are unilaterally imposed upon the adherent and that do not require a
signature in order to be binding. See KIM, supra note 23, at 2–3 (defining a “wrap contract” as a
“blanket term to refer to a unilaterally imposed set of terms which the drafter purports to be legally
binding and which is presented to the nondrafting party in a nontraditional format. . . . the adhering
party does not have to use a pen in order to accept the terms”); see also MICHAEL L. RUSTAD,
GLOBAL INTERNET LAW 186–95 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing different types of wrap contracts).
207. No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 WL 1942139 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018).
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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print” at the bottom of the box, it stated that “Terms and Conditions
apply” to the “Digital HD.”212 The download code insert stated that
“Codes are not for sale or transfer.”213
The Redeem Digital Movie website stated that the user
“represents that [he] is the owner of the physical product that
accompanied the digital code at the time of purchase. The redemption
of a digital code sold or transferred separate from the original physical
product is prohibited.”214
The Movies Anywhere Terms of Use stated that the consumer
“can enter authorized . . . Digital Copy codes from a Digital Copy
enabled . . . physical product that is owned by [that consumer].”215
They also stated that the “sale, distribution, purchase, or transfer of
Digital Copy codes . . . is strictly prohibited.”216 Thus, the member
was granted a “limited, personal use, non-transferable, nonassignable, revocable non-exclusive and non-sublicensable right” to
use the service and restricted the right to copy the copyright works in
accordance with the terms of service.217
Redbox, the defendant, purchased Combo Packs and removed the
digital download codes, placed them into their own Redbox
packaging, and offered them for sale at Redbox kiosks.218 Disney
sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop Redbox from offering
standalone digital codes.219 It argued that Redbox entered into the
contract when it purchased the Combo Packs that contained terms on
the outside, which stated that “Codes are not for sale or transfer.”220
The court denied Disney’s motion based on the specific language
printed on the outside of the Combo Pack boxes,221 stating: “The
phrase ‘Codes are not for sale or transfer’ cannot constitute a shrink
wrap contract because . . . Disney’s Combo Pack box makes no

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (alteration in original).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
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suggestion that opening the box constitutes acceptance of any further
license restrictions.”222
The court differentiated the box-top license language in Arizona
Cartridge, because Lexmark
not only provided consumers with specific notice of the
existence of a license and explicitly stated that opening the
package would constitute acceptance, but also set forth the
full terms of the agreement, including the nature of the
consideration provided, and described a post-purchase
mechanism for rejecting the license. Here, in contrast,
Disney relied solely upon the phrase “Codes are not for sale
or transfer” to carry all of that weight.223
The court criticized “similarly assertive but unquestionably nonbinding language” on the boxes.224 In particular, it noted that the
language that “[t]his product . . . cannot be resold or rented
individually” was “demonstrably false” because it violated the
Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine.225 Accordingly, the “clearly
unenforceable ‘cannot be resold individually’ language conveys
nothing so much as Disney’s preference about consumers’ future
behavior, rather than the existence of a binding agreement. At this
stage, it appears that the accompanying ‘Not For Sale or Transfer’
language plays a similar role.”226
Finally, the court indicated that Disney engaged in copyright
misuse because it did not have the power to prevent consumers from
selling or transferring the Blu-Ray discs or DVDs, yet the license
agreements of both Redeem Digital Movies and Movies Anywhere
assumed it did, and prohibited purchasers of Combo Packs from
accessing the digital movie content even though they had already paid
for it.227

222. Id. at *4 (citing Norcia v. Samsung Telecommc’ns. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th
Cir. 2017)).
223. Id.
224. Id. at *5.
225. Id. (alteration in original).
226. Id.
227. Id. at *6.
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The court also addressed the first sale doctrine as it related to the
transaction but found it was inapplicable.228 Redbox argued “Disney’s
attempts to prohibit transfer of digital download codes [were] barred
by the first sale doctrine.”229 Disney, on the other hand, argued that the
first sale doctrine was inapplicable because the digital download codes
were not “copies” until they were fixed on a downloader’s hard
drive.230 According to Disney, the transaction involved the exclusive
right to reproduce copyrighted work, not the right of distribution.231
The court agreed, finding that “Disney appears to have sold something
akin to an option to create a physical copy at some point in the
future.”232 It concluded that, because there was no “particular, fixed
copy of a copyrighted work” at the time Redbox purchased the
download code, the first sale doctrine did not apply.233
Subsequently, Disney changed the language on its Combo Pack
boxes.234 The front of the box indicated that it contained a “Digital
Code.”235 The back of the box stated in large print, “Digital Code
Included*.”236 The asterisk corresponded to a textbox at the bottom of
the package, which stated in all-capitalized but smaller text, “Digital
code redemption requires prior acceptance of license terms and
conditions. Codes only for personal use by recipient of this
combination package or family member. Digital movie code . . .
subject to expiration after May 15, 2023.”237 Elsewhere, in smaller
type, the packaging stated, “The digital code contained in this package
may not be sold separately and may be redeemed only by the recipient
of this combination package or a family member. Visit MoviesAnyw
here.com, RedeemDigitalMovie.com, and disneytermsofuse.com for

228. Id. at *7 (stating that “the issues presently before the court can be resolved irrespective of
the first sale doctrine question. Indeed, at this stage of proceedings, it appears to the court that the
first sale doctrine is not applicable to this case”).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (“Thus, Disney contends, this case is solely about the exclusive right to reproduce a
copyrighted work, and has nothing to do with the right of distribution or, by extension, the first sale
doctrine's limitation on that exclusive right.”).
232. Id. at *9.
233. Id.
234. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1150 (C.D.
Cal. 2018).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (alteration in original).
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code redemption and other applicable terms and conditions.”238 The
paper with the code contained a similar notice and stated, “This digital
code is part of a combination package and may not be sold separately”
and “Digital code redemption is subject to prior acceptance of license
terms and conditions.”239
Disney also changed the terms of use on the digital download
websites. 240 On the RedeemDigitalMovie.com was a pop-up box that
stated that the digital movie codes were owned by Disney and could
not be sold separately from the original combination package.241 It
also stated that the codes could be used “to obtain licensed access to
digital movies only as specifically authorized” under the terms and
conditions.242 The Movies Anywhere Terms of Use stated that a
license to download or stream content did not create an ownership
interest; that users would not redeem an unauthorized digital code; and
that by redeeming a digital code, the user was representing that the
user obtained the code in an original package and did not purchase the
code separately and that the “representation is a condition of
redemption.”243 In addition, the consumer was required to redeem the
code by clicking in order to view the content.244
Disney then renewed its motion for a preliminary injunction
against Redbox.245 It alleged that Redbox customers who purchased a
Disney code from Redbox violated Disney’s copyright because they
were essentially making a false representation that they did not obtain
the Code separate from the Combo Pack.246 Accordingly, any
download using the code was unauthorized and infringed Disney’s
copyright, and Redbox was contributorily liable for that
infringement.247 The court stated that there was “no dispute” that the
language on the download sites imposed significant use restrictions,
and it granted Disney’s motion.248 In reaching that conclusion, the
court focused on the enforceability of the relevant terms, both on the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1152.

(7) 54.1_KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/25/21 5:56 PM

REVISITING THE LICENSE V. SALE CONUNDRUM

133

packaging and on the download sites.249 But what the court found to
be “critically important” was that consumers who did not accept the
terms of the digital license could return the Combo Packs for a
refund.250 The court also rejected Redbox’s copyright misuse
defense.251 Because digital access was conditioned on the manner of
obtaining the digital code, and not on continued possession of the
physical discs, there was no copyright misuse.252 As the court noted,
“the right to transfer a separate Code” is not protected by the first sale
doctrine.253
The court’s analysis is somewhat confounding; a simpler way to
understand the difference in the two cases involves recognizing the
Combo Packs as license-sale transactions (one involving both a sale
and a license). The physical discs were sold, while the digital content
was licensed, not sold. Combo Pack purchasers did not purchase the
slips of paper containing the digital codes; they purchased a license to
the digital content. The paper merely directed the purchaser to a
website where the purchaser could license the content. Disney retained
control over the purchasers’ use of the digital content; by contrast, it
did not control the purchasers’ access to the physical discs after
purchase. Disney (through the download websites) retained the power
to control the purchasers’ access to the digital content. It did not retain
the power to control the purchasers’ access to the content stored on the
physical discs.
Yet, a conclusion that digital content is licensed and not sold
should not necessarily lead to a finding that a violation of any contract
provision constitutes copyright infringement. In granting Disney’s
refiled motion for preliminary injunction, the court focused on the
specificity of the redrafted language.254 While the new language did
249. Id. at 1153.
250. Id. at 1155.
251. Id. at 1157.
252. Id. (“Under the old terms, a Combo Pack owner who disposed of the discs was indeed left
with a worthless code because continued possession of the discs was a condition of digital access.
Now, however, digital access is conditioned not on possession of the discs, but on the manner of
Code acquisition. A Combo Pack owner who disposes of the discs is left with the same digital
access rights he or she always possessed.”).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1154. The court stated:
It is undisputed that Redbox has actual knowledge of the redemption sites’
clickwrap terms, which do appear to create a restrictive license. Both sites specify
that the user is only granted a license rather than ownership. The
RedeemDigitalMovie.com terms state, “You may use digital movie codes to obtain
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provide better notice than the original language, the court did not
consider whether that new language imposed a condition to the license
grant or whether it was merely a covenant on the part of the
purchaser.255 The difference is integral to the license v. sale dilemma.
C. Conditions v. Covenants in Patent and Copyright Licenses
Even with valid contract formation, a restrictive licensing clause
may not be enforceable, or it may not be enforced the way the licensor
expects or desires. For example, in U.S. Naval Institute v. Charter
Communications, Inc.,256 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether a licensee’s premature publication of the paperback
edition of a book constituted copyright infringement.257 The plaintiff,
United States Naval Institute (“Naval”), and the defendant, Berkley
Publishing Group (“Berkley”), entered into an agreement “made this
14th day of September 1984” that granted Berkley “the exclusive right
to publish and reproduce, distribute and sell English-language
paperback editions” of the novel The Hunt for Red October.258
Paragraph 2 of the agreement stated that the term of the license “will
begin on the date written above” and would continue for at least five
years after Berkley’s first publication of the book.259 Paragraph 4 of
the agreement stated that “Berkley was to publish the paperback

licensed access to digital movies only as specifically authorized . . . [,]” and the
Movies Anywhere terms refer to a “Copyright License Grant” and state that “[t]he
purchase of a license to stream or download any Movies Anywhere Content does
not create an ownership interest in the licensed Content.” These and other terms
restrict downloaders’ use or transfer of the digital content.
Id. (alteration in the original).
255. It also skated around but did not directly tackle the issue of digital first sale. In another
case, however, the Second Circuit found that the first sale doctrine did not apply to digital media.
In Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018), ReDigi sought to host an
online marketplace for reselling lawfully purchased digital music files. Id. at 652. The plaintiff
record companies sued, alleging that ReDigi’s system infringed their copyrights. Id. at 654. On
appeal, the court framed the “primary issue” to be “whether ReDigi’s system version 1.0 lawfully
enables resales of its users’ digital files” and found that resales of ReDigi infringed because they
violated the plaintiffs’ exclusive right of reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Id. at 655–64. In
so ruling, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court. Id. at 652. The lower court also found
that the digital files were not subject to the first sale doctrine because they were not “lawfully
made,” but the Second Circuit, finding sufficient grounds for affirmance, declined to rule on this
issue. Id. at 656.
256. 936 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991).
257. Id. at 694.
258. Id. at 693, 695.
259. Id. at 695.
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edition ‘not sooner than October 1985.’”260 Berkley shipped the
paperback edition early so that retail sales began on September 15,
1985.261 Naval sought recovery for copyright infringement.262 Berkley
argued that it “could not be held liable for copyright infringement
since [it was] the exclusive licensee of the paperback edition copyright
as of September 14, 1984.”263 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, finding that because Berkley was the owner of the right to
publish the paperback edition of the book, its early publication could
not constitute copyright infringement.264 It did, however, constitute a
breach of contract.265
Under the Copyright Act, “[a]n exclusive license granted by the
copyright owner constitutes a transfer of ownership of the copyright
rights conveyed in the license.”266 But the condition v. covenant
distinction is not limited to exclusive licenses. In Blizzard, after
deciding that WoW players were licensees and not owners of copies
of the software, the court addressed the issue of contractual covenants
and license conditions.267 It characterized contractual terms that
limited the scope of the license as “conditions,” and distinguished
them from other terms which were “covenants.”268 Thus, in order for
Blizzard to demonstrate that a user committed copyright infringement,
it had to demonstrate that the term that the user violated was a
condition rather than a covenant.269
In order to determine whether a provision is a covenant or a
condition, courts look to contract law. In a license v. sale transaction,
contract law determines which legal regime—copyright or contract—
applies to the underlying claim and thus, whether the claim is for
copyright infringement or breach of contract. As the Blizzard court
explained, “[a] covenant is a contractual promise . . . to act or refrain
260. Id.
261. Id. at 693.
262. Id. at 694.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 695.
265. Id. at 696; see also U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding that Berkley violated the contractual ban on pre-October 1985 publication).
266. U.S. Naval Inst., 936 F.2d at 695; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘transfer of
copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance . . .
of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited
in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”).
267. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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from acting in a particular way” while “[a] condition precedent is an
act or event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise
arises.”270 The Blizzard court stated that “[t]o recover for copyright
infringement based on breach of a license agreement, (1) the copying
must exceed the scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the copyright
owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of copyright
(e.g., unlawful reproduction or distribution).”271
Significantly, it stated that “for a licensee’s violation of a contract
to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between
the condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.”272
Courts generally apply an interpretive preference in favor of
finding a covenant rather than a condition where the language is
uncertain; this is particularly true where the failure to meet a condition
would result in a forfeiture.273 Consequently, in Blizzard, the court
found that despite the relevant section being titled “Limitations on
Your Use of the Service,” the contractual prohibitions against bots and
unauthorized third-party software were covenants and not conditions
because they did not condition Blizzard’s grant of license on the
players’ compliance to the prohibitions.274
D. Ownership Rights and the Limits of Contractual Authority
Although the Supreme Court noted the “historical kinship”
between copyright and patent law, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
noted, they are not “identical twins.”275 Their dissimilarities are
especially relevant where the license agreement does not give the
licensee the right to “sell.” A patent gives the patentee the right to

270. Id.
271. Id. at 940.
272. Id. at 941; see also Accusoft Corp. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-40007-TSH, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156693, at *72 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2015) (“It is settled law in this circuit that
uses of a copyrighted work that stay within the scope of a nontransferable license are immunized
from copyright claims.”).
273. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939 (noting that “[c]onditions precedent are disfavored because
they tend to work forfeitures” and “[w]herever possible, equity construes ambiguous contract
provisions as covenants rather than conditions”); see also Richard F. Kline, Inc. v. Shook
Excavating & Hauling, Inc., 885 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (“Whether a provision
in a contract constitutes a condition precedent is a question of ‘construction, dependent on the intent
of the parties to be gathered from the words they have employed and, in case of ambiguity, after
resort to the other permissible aids to interpretation.’”).
274. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939–40.
275. Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1539 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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exclude others from making, using, selling, and importing the
invention.276 A copyright owner, on the other hand, has the exclusive
right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, publicly
perform, and publicly display the copyrighted work.277 The ownership
rights determine the types of restrictions that may be placed on
subsequent transactions.
Patent licenses where the licensee is a distributor of product
usually include the right to make, use, sell, and offer to sell. Copyright
licenses, on the other hand, do not. The reason for this difference stems
from the different rights of copyright and patent holders. For example,
if Patentee licenses to Licensee the right to make and use, but not to
sell, the patented invention, Licensee may not enter into a subsequent
transaction with a third party unless Patentee has given Licensee a
right to sublicense the invention. Even then, Licensee may only
sublicense the rights that he or she has. Because the agreement
between Patentee and Licensee did not permit Licensee to sell the
invention—and Patentee did not sell the invention to Licensee—there
has been no “authorized sale,” and neither the Licensee nor the
Sublicensee is authorized to sell the invention.
By contrast, if Copyright Owner licenses to Licensee the right to
make copies and distribute an item, the Licensee may make a copy and
sell it to Customer since the Copyright Owner does not have the right
to exclude the Licensee from selling. If Copyright Owner and
Licensee’s contract prohibited the Licensee from selling the copy, the
Licensee would have breached their contract although he or she would
not have infringed the license. In this important respect, transactions
involving patented items and copyrighted items typically differ.
There is also the question of contractual authority and
enforceability. The cases tend not to distinguish between contract
terms that are negotiated, those that are non-negotiated due to lack of
bargaining power, and those that are unilaterally imposed by one party
after the transaction has occurred. Yet, these scenarios are quite
different. Where the parties have negotiated the contract, any
conditions on the transaction shape the nature of the transaction.
Where one party has unilaterally imposed terms with a standard form,
it is not clear that the terms should be enforced. As I have noted

276. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018).
277. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
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elsewhere, a notice is not always a contract.278 A notice does not
constitute a contract unless the other party intended to agree to it.279
There can be no bargain, no mutual assent, and no contract unless the
non-drafting party intends to engage in conduct that manifests
assent. 280 The silence of the offeree generally does not manifest
acceptance. 281 As the Ninth Circuit noted in a recent case, “[a]n offeree
may demonstrate acceptance through conduct, but not where . . . the
contractual provisions are ‘inconspicuous’ and ‘contained in a
document whose contractual nature is not obvious.’”282
If the offeree does not manifest assent, then the terms are merely
a notice and their effectiveness depends upon whether the entity
drafting the notice had the authority to unilaterally impose terms. The
authority of the drafter to unilaterally impose terms is tied to property
ownership. For example, X’s authority to enforce a “No Smoking”
sign depends on whether X owns the property where the sign is posted.
X’s authority to unilaterally impose terms does not extend to property
that X does not own. Furthermore, X’s authority to enforce a “No
Smoking” sign does not mean that X can unilaterally impose upon Y a
one-hundred-dollar fee for smoking, even if Y smokes on X’s property.
If X wishes to impose a one-hundred-dollar fee on those who smoke
on X’s property, the “$100 Fee for Smoking on Property” notice must
be conspicuous enough so that Y understands that by entering X’s
property, Y must adhere to those terms. In that situation, the notice
“$100 Fee for Smoking on Property” is contractual and Y manifests
assent by entering the property. However, after the transaction has
occurred, X has no power to unilaterally impose terms. For example,
X cannot charge Y an entrance fee after the visit unless Y had notice
of the fee prior to the visit. X’s power is tied to X’s property.
278. KIM, supra note 23, at 135 (noting that the “essential problem with wrap contract doctrine
is that courts mistake the role of notice with that of contract” but that notice is “very different from
contract”).
279. KIM, supra note 23, at 134.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“The conduct of a
party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and
knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”).
281. Id. (noting that the silence of the offeree without intent to engage in conduct does not
manifest acceptance); see also Norcia v. Samsung Telecommc’ns. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1284
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing California’s general rule that “silence or inaction does not constitute
acceptance of an offer”).
282. Velasquez-Reyes v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 777 F. App’x 241, 241 (9th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Windsor Mills Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972)).
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Moreover, the power of the parties to reorder their rights and
obligations is limited to those rights and obligations; they do not have
the power to recharacterize relationships that are defined by law,
although they may define their rights and obligations so that they fall
into a particular legal definition. Contracting parties, for example,
cannot define whether their relationship is a partnership; that
relationship is defined by the law and determined by whether they are
engaged in a business for profit. If they are, they may alter the
particulars of that relationship, but they cannot deny that they are in a
partnership by writing it on a piece of paper that they both sign.
Similarly, contracting parties cannot recharacterize an employment
relationship as an independent contractor relationship.283 These terms
are beyond the contract-making purview of the parties. For the same
reason, the parties cannot change a sale into a license simply by so
stating in their contract.
The court in Blizzard made a fundamental error because it did not
distinguish the sale of the software from the sale of the license. The
WoW software was not sold, but the license to use that software
was.284 The transfer of the license is subject to the first sale doctrine.
The licensor does not have the power to recharacterize the transaction
or to restrict its sale because that is not one of the exclusive rights of a
copyright owner.285 It may, however, limit the scope of the license or
subject the license to a condition precedent with properly drafted
language.286
Similarly, a patentee may not recharacterize a transaction that is
a sale as a license; it may, however, restrict the license so that certain
conditions must be met before a sale is authorized. The doctrine of
patent exhaustion means that the patentee may not impose post-sale
restrictions.287 The result is different under copyright’s first sale

283. See Type of Relationship, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/type-of-relationship (last reviewed or updated July 31, 2020) (stating that “[a]lthough a
contract may state that the worker is an employee or an independent contractor, this is not sufficient
to determine the worker’s status. The IRS is not required to follow a contract stating that the worker
is an independent contractor, responsible for paying his or her own self employment tax. How the
parties work together determines whether the worker is an employee or an independent
contractor”).
284. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010).
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
286. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 939.
287. Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017).
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doctrine. A copyright holder may impose post-sale restrictions as long
as they derive from her exclusive copyright rights.288
For example, Patentee enters into an agreement with Retailer
where Retailer may sell, but only at its stores in North America,
patented items to Customers. If Retailer sells patented items to
Customers at its stores in North America, those Customers are not
limited by the terms of the agreement between Patentee and Retailer.
Accordingly, Customer may sell the patented item in Europe provided
that Customer made her original purchase at Retailer’s store in North
America (i.e., it was an “authorized sale”).
The result is different for copyright restrictions. Assume
Copyright Owner enters into an agreement with Retailer where
Retailer may sell, but only at its stores in North America, items to
Customers with certain copyright restrictions. If Retailer sells those
copyright items to Customer, those items continue to be subject to the
copyright restrictions. Customer may not, for example, make copies
of the item if the license prohibits copying. Customer may, however,
sell the licensed item because a copyright owner does not have the
power to limit sales of copyrighted works because the right to exclude
others from selling is not one of the copyright holder’s exclusive
rights.289
IV. A METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING LICENSE V. SALE
TRANSACTIONS
The case law at first glance may seem impenetrable but on closer
examination yields several important principles that can be used to
assess the license v. sale issue. First, an authorized sale—and only an
authorized sale—triggers the copyright first sale doctrine and patent
exhaustion. Second, a contractual breach differs from infringement.
Infringement occurs when the licensee exceeds the scope of the license
but not where the licensee breaches another provision. Finally, a
contract may give rise to both a claim for breach and a claim for
infringement; however, the claims cannot be for violating the same
provision. In short, it is important to distinguish the provisions of a
contract and to understand their legal effect. Some provisions may
express an undertaking (i.e., a covenant) and thus create an obligation;

288. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
289. Id.
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other provisions may express permission (i.e., a grant) and thus
authorize actions that would otherwise be impermissible.
In this Part IV, I propose a methodology for analyzing whether a
transaction is a license or a sale. This methodology requires first
analyzing the structure of the transaction in order to characterize it as
a license, a sale, or a sale of a license. Then it analyzes the nature of
the terms to assess the nature and enforceability of the restrictions. As
previously mentioned, the characteristics of the transaction, and not
what the parties call it in their contract, determine whether it is a
license or sale and whether the UCC applies. However, the parties may
shape the characteristics of the transaction contractually. The power
to do that differs depending on whether the transaction involves a
patent or a copyright.
Software poses unique challenges because it may involve both a
patent and a copyright. In negotiated transactions where the license
agreement was entered into prior to the acts that constitute the
transaction (i.e., the transaction did not involve a rolling contract), the
transaction is a license, not a sale, which may involve both patent
rights and copyrights. Consequently, a restriction on subsequent
transfers is enforceable because there was no patent exhaustion.
However, in mass consumer transactions where the license agreement
is a rolling contract, the transaction is a sale. The sale results in patent
exhaustion and the copyright first sale doctrine also applies. The
license terms that purport to restrict the purchaser’s right to transfer
the software should not be enforceable as the patentee’s exclusive
rights are exhausted with respect to that product. However, the license
terms that restrict the purchaser’s use of the product are enforceable
because the copyright holder’s rights are not exhausted under the first
sale doctrine, which only permits subsequent transfers. Yet, not every
violation of the license agreement constitutes infringement. The effect
of any given provision depends on whether the provision is drafted as
a covenant or a condition.
My proposed methodology recognizes the difference between a
license restriction in a negotiated agreement and one in a mass
adhesive form agreement. The enforcement of the reasonable
expectations of the parties is a bedrock principle of contract law that
has been discarded by law-and-economics-minded courts in their
quest for a type of efficiency that considers only the elimination of
transactional hurdles. My proposed methodology reflects the realities
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of mass adhesive form contracting to better reflect the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
A. Reasonable Expectations and the Form of Wrap Contracts
Studies have demonstrated that most consumers do not read
standard form software license contracts.290 Although an actual intent
to be legally bound to terms may not be required for contract
formation, contract terms should reflect what the parties intended.291
The role of courts in construing a contract is to determine the intent of
the parties and to ascertain what they “reasonably understood to be the
terms of the agreement.”292 As one court noted, “[s]tandardized
contracts of adhesion do not squarely fit within a traditional analysis
of contractual intent.”293 As a result, in the context of standardized
contracts, a factfinder may consider “‘the totality of the circumstances
in determining the intent of the parties, rather than being strictly
confined to the four corners of a standardized agreement’ when the
parties’ ‘true intent was not accurately reflected in the written
contract.’”294
Section 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) Contracts states that
“[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”295
This principle of “reasonable expectations” with standardized

290. Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to StandardForm Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014) (finding that “only one or two of every 1,000 retail
software shoppers” accesses license agreements); Nathaniel S. Good et al., Noticing Notice: A
Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License Agreements 5 (2007) (conference
paper) (reporting that only 1.4% of 222 subjects read end-user license agreements often and 66.2%
reported rarely reading or browsing them).
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Neither real nor
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but
a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation
of a contract.”).
292. See Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1288 (D. Utah 2017) (quoting
State v. Terrazas, 336 P.3d 594, 605 (Utah Ct. App. 2014)) (stating that the “underlying purpose in
construing a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties, and to identify what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement” (quoting Terrazas, 336 P.3d at 605)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1289 (quoting Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 810 (Utah
1992) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Lauvetz
v. Alaska Sales and Serv., 828 P.2d 162, 165 (Alaska 1991) (applying the analysis of section 211
outside the insurance context).
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agreements recognizes that “[a]lthough customers typically adhere to
standardized agreements and are bound by them without even
appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation.”296 Professor Eric Zacks notes, “[s]ection 211 was an
elegantly designed, thoughtful solution by impressive contract
theorists to address the problem of assent to standardized contracts,”
but it is “rarely cited with respect to any standardized contract dispute,
and even where cited, it rarely provides relief to the non-drafting
party.”297 Notwithstanding its underappreciated status, section 211(3)
is, as Professor Wayne Barnes writes, “a rule that is consistent with
the objective theory of contracts and with general principles of the
assent-based nature of contracts.”298
The reasonable expectations doctrine captured in section 211(3)
may be particularly helpful in mitigating the problems associated with
wrap contracts. The expectations of the non-drafting party are often
established by the form of the contract.299 A consumer signing a
contract with a pen has awareness that the transaction is a legal one,
even if he or she has not read the terms. A consumer clicking an
“Agree” icon may be less aware of the legally binding nature of that
click, and a consumer simply browsing a website with a conspicuous
hyperlink may be completely unaware of the legal nature of that
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Gove
v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., 689 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that “where the parties are in
unequal bargaining positions, such as ‘[w]here a standard-form, printed contract is submitted to the
other on a “take it or leave it” basis, upon equitable principles the provisions of the contract are
generally construed to meet the reasonable expectations of the party in the inferior bargaining
position” (alteration in original) (quoting Barrett v. McDonald Invs., Inc., 870 A2d. 146, 150 (Me.
2005))).
297. Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and
the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 736
(2016). But cf. Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. 1996)
(noting that “[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved as an interpretative tool to aid
courts in discerning the intention of the parties bound by adhesion contracts. It . . . takes into
account the realities of present day commercial practice”).
298. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 231 (2007).
Barnes also noted that it is “[o]verlooked and underappreciated in the debate over the proper
treatment of standard form contracts.” Id.; cf. Zacks, supra note 297, at 758 (finding “only 196
cases cited section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts” with only 34 where the nondrafting party received “some form of relief”).
299. See KIM, supra note 23, at 200–01 (“The form of a contract, like its function, sets
expectations. . . . The reasonable expectations of parties depend upon what type of contract is at
issue.”).
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transaction. Courts should consider the form of a contract in assessing
the reasonable expectations of the parties.300
License-sales transactions accomplished with adhesive wrap
contracts raise unique policy concerns. Bargaining imbalance and the
failure to read and understand the fine print are problems associated
with adhesive contracts generally; however, they are particularly
striking in the context of license-sale transactions that may affect
important rights to use or transfer a product.
Consumer reasonable expectations of the substance of terms
should be distinguished from consumer complacency or inaction,
which is related to the likelihood that a given term will be enforced.
Some provisions in standard commercial transactions may be
overlooked because they relate to events that consumers believe are
not likely to occur. For example, terms such as those imposing
mandatory arbitration, warranty disclaimers, and limitations of
liability become relevant only if a dispute arises between the parties.
These terms301 may never be raised or enforced in a transaction if there
is no dispute between the parties. By contrast, license terms alter the
very essence of a transaction that otherwise resembles an ordinary
sale. A typical license-sale transaction seems like a sales transaction
to the average consumer at the time the transaction is completed, and
the consumer may expect to have the benefits of ownership postpurchase.
To recognize consumer reasonable expectations does not mean
that the company cannot impose other rules or conditions by
agreement; however, if it wishes to do so, it cannot unilaterally impose
terms in a standard form subject only to a standard of “reasonable
notice.” Instead, the business should be required to have the consumer
specifically assent to those terms by separately signing the relevant
provision. Bringing the specific term to the consumer’s attention
makes it more salient, and thus more likely to be within that
consumer’s reasonable expectations.302 This type of specific assent is

300. Id. at 201 (“An interpretive framework that expressly considers the form and function of
a contract reflects reality and better protects the reasonable expectations of the parties.”).
301. See generally id. at 44–48 (describing how various contract terms may be used to limit
liability in certain circumstances).
302. Even in this scenario, the term may be unenforceable if it is against public policy or subject
to a contract defense, such as unconscionability.
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also consistent with the common law,303 the UCC,304 and with current
trends in electronic contracting law.305 In an influential case, the court
in Berkson v. Gogo LLC306 proposed a four-part test to analyze
electronic adhesive contracts that asks, in part: “Did the merchant
clearly draw the consumer’s attention to material terms that would
alter what a reasonable consumer would understand to be her default
rights when initiating an online consumer transaction from the
consumer’s state of residence . . . ?”307
Imposing a specific assent requirement accords with canons of
construction. Courts generally construe ambiguous terms in a contract
against the drafter, especially if the contract is one of adhesion.308 As
previously mentioned, there is also an interpretive preference against
conditions that would result in a forfeiture. Given these canons of
construction and the realities of standard form contracting, in order for
a restriction in a standard form license agreement to be interpreted as
a condition, the non-drafting party should have specifically assented
to it.

303. Certain provisions, such as limitations of liability, must be drawn to the attention of the
adhering party. See Berrios v. United Parcel Serv., 627 A.2d 701, 705 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992) (noting that limitations of liability are ineffective where motorists were not made aware of
it), aff’d per curiam, 672 A2d. 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder,
551 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (noting that posted notice limiting liability must be
called to attention of bailor before it can be deemed part of bailment contract).
304. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (stating that
additional terms are proposals and not part of the contract if the other party is not a merchant); id.
§ 2-209(2) (requiring no-oral modification clause to be separately signed by non-merchant).
305. Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (four-part test that
includes inquiry regarding notice of specific terms); Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029,
1035 (7th Cir. 2016) (clicking on a box does not mean that consumer has notice of all contract
terms); Scotti v. Tough Mudder Inc., 97 N.Y.S.3d 825, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (despite
conspicuousness of agreement, the arbitration provision was not sufficiently conspicuous).
306. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
307. Id. at 402. The Berkson court mentioned specifically “[t]he right to (a) not have a payment
source charged without notice (i.e., automatic payment renewal); (b) bring a civil consumer
protection action under the law of her state of residence and in the courts in her state of residence;
and (c) participate in a class or collective action? If not, then (a), (b), or (c) should not be enforced
against the consumer.” Id.
308. See Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1286 (D. Utah 2017)
(“Ambiguous language is construed against the drafter, particularly in the context of adhesion
contracts.”); Gove. v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., 689 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that a contract
“is to be interpreted to effect the parties’ intentions as reflected in the written instrument, construed
with regard for the subject matter, motive, and purpose of the agreement, as well as the object to
be accomplished. . . . [A]mbiguities in a document are construed against its drafter. . . . This rule is
intended to effectuate the intent of the parties” (citations omitted)).
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Furthermore, the requirement of specific assent to material terms
is consistent with commercial law and its efforts to balance the needs
of the marketplace with contract law objectives. In particular, section
2-207 of the UCC balances the realities of form contracts with the
expectations of the parties by requiring specific assent to material
terms to avoid unfair surprise.309 Notably, additional or different terms
contained in a form agreement between a merchant and a consumer
are not part of a contract unless agreed to by the consumer.310
Similarly, a provision in a standard form that seeks to condition use of
the license in a way that defeats the reasonable expectations of the
consumer should not be considered part of the contract.
B. Transaction Sequence and Contractual Consequence
A business may use restrictive contractual terms to try to
characterize a transaction as a license or sale. If the transaction
involves a patented item, the contractual terms determine whether the
transaction is a sale or a license because the patentee has the right to
characterize the transaction. If, however, the transaction involves a
copyrighted item, the contractual language is useful in assessing the
characteristics of the transaction, but it is not determinative. The
copyright holder does not have the right to characterize the transaction
as a sale or a license; it may, however, structure the transaction in such
a way that it fits the legal definition of a license or a sale.
A business also may use contracts in an effort to impose post-sale
restrictions. If the transaction is a sale, then the patentee’s patent rights
are exhausted, and the purchaser may sell that item to another party
regardless of a contractual prohibition on subsequent sale. Similarly,
the sale of a copyrighted item means that the purchaser may
subsequently sell that item to another party. However, unlike with a
patent transaction, a sale does not terminate the copyright holder’s
rights. Finally, contractual language determines the scope of the
license. Restrictive contractual terms may be either conditions or
covenants. Failure to comply with a condition that limits a license’s
309. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (permitting additional
terms in a standard form acceptance between merchants unless the terms “materially alter” the
terms of the offer); see also id. cmt. 3 (stating that terms that materially alter the original bargain
are not included “unless expressly agreed to by the other party”).
310. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1951) (stating that additional terms
in a standard form acceptance are “proposals for addition to the contract” unless the terms are
between merchants).
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scope means that the licensee has infringed.311 A failure to comply
with any other provision may constitute a breach of contract but will
not constitute infringement.
1. Contractual Restrictions and Transactions Involving Patents
Although a patentee may prevent a licensee from selling the
patented item, it may not prevent a purchaser of that item from doing
so.312 Consequently, the nature of subsequent transactions depends
upon the original transaction between the patentee and the licensee or
purchaser. The following illustrates how the license v. sale question
should be analyzed for transactions involving patented items:
(1) If the first transaction by the patentee is a sale, then
subsequent transactions involving that same item can also be sales. For
example, if Patentee enters into a contract where it sells patented items
to Retailer, Retailer may sell that item to Customer Z.
(2) If the first transaction by the Patentee is a license, then
subsequent transactions may be either licenses or sales depending on
the scope of the license between Patentee and Licensee.
The license agreement may have the following types of
provisions: (a) it might permit the Licensee to sell patented items
without any restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to do so; (b) it might
permit the Licensee to sell items with restrictions on the Licensee’s
ability to do so; (c) it might permit the Licensee to sell items without
restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to do so but require the Licensee
to impose conditions on his or her customers; and (d) it might allow
Licensee to sublicense patented items. The validity of each of these
terms is discussed below:
a. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell
patented items without restrictions on the Licensee’s ability to
311. See Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 924 F.3d 32, 49 (2d Cir. 2019)
(stating that despite parties being in contractual privity, “vindication of an exclusive right under the
Copyright Act, read into a license by negative implication, is preempted by the Copyright Act”);
see also Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating
that because licensor sued licensee for publishing works after the contract had expired, the claim
was for copyright infringement and not breach of contract); Marshall v. New Kids on the Block
P’ship, 780 F. Supp. 1005, 1008–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that “if the plaintiff-licensor seeks
relief directly under the licensing agreement . . . then the claim is merely a state law contract claim,”
but that if the licensee uses the copyright material in a manner that “exceeds either the duration or
the scope of the license,” then the action “arises under the copyright laws just as if the claim were
against any other infringer who is a stranger to the plaintiff”).
312. See Impression, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535 (2017).
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do so, then subsequent transactions can be sales. For example, if
Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell,
and offer to sell patented items, then Manufacturer can sell the
item to Customer.
b. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell
patented items but imposes restrictive conditions on the
Licensee’s ability to do so, then subsequent transactions are
authorized sales only if the Licensee complied with the
conditions.
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell,
and offer to sell patented items only in North America, then
Manufacturer’s sale of the item in France is unauthorized, and patent
exhaustion does not apply.
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell,
and offer to sell patented items only in North America, then
Manufacturer’s subsequent sale of the item to Customer in Canada is
authorized. That item may be subsequently sold by Customer in
France (or anywhere else in the world), and the territorial limitation in
the agreement between Patentee and Manufacturer does not prevent
patent exhaustion.
c. If the license agreement provides that Licensee may sell
patented items but requires that Licensee impose post-sale
restrictions upon his or her customers, subsequent transactions
nevertheless can be sales which are not subject to those post-sale
restrictions.
Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to make, use, sell, and
offer to sell items but requires Manufacturer to have its customers sign
contracts restricting the use of the patented products. Manufacturer’s
subsequent sale of patented item to Customer is authorized and
triggers patent exhaustion even if Manufacturer neglected to have
Customer sign contract restricting the use of the patented product.
Manufacturer may have breached its contract with Patentee, and
Patentee may sue for breach of contract; it may not, however, sue
Manufacturer (or Customer) for patent infringement. Similarly, if
Manufacturer had Customer sign a contract as required under
Manufacturer’s agreement with Patentee, but Customer breached the
contract, Manufacturer (and likely Patentee as third-party beneficiary)
may sue Customer for breach of contract, but Patentee may not sue
Customer for patent infringement.
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d. If the license agreement permits Licensee to sublicense but
does not permit the Licensee to sell the patented item, then
subsequent transactions are not sales.
If Patentee licenses to Manufacturer the right to sublicense, then
Manufacturer’s subsequent transaction with Customer cannot be a sale
and Customer’s use is limited to the terms of the sublicense because
there was no authorized first sale.
2. Contractual Restrictions and Transactions Involving Copyright
Software is at the heart of the license v. sale dilemma because in
order to use it, the purchaser of the license must make a copy or
distribution, and doing so implicates an exclusive right of the
copyright holder. Someone who transfers previously used software to
another party in violation of a “no transfer/no copying” provision may
be liable for contributory copyright infringement because the use of
that software necessarily requires copying the content a second time—
a right that a license containing a “no transfer/no copying” provision
does not grant. By contrast, someone who transfers a copy of a
tangible item, such as a book or painting, in violation of a “no
transfer/no copying” provision does not infringe, because the
transferee, despite such a provision, may use the tangible item in a way
that does not infringe the copyright holder’s exclusive rights (such as
by reading the book or viewing the painting, but not by making copies
and distributing it).
Streaming content and hosted content, however, are not sold;
rather, access to the content is licensed and conditioned upon
adherence to the host website’s terms of service. Yet, simply because
digital content is licensed and not sold does not mean that every
violation of the terms of service constitutes a copyright violation.
Rather, only violations of those provisions upon which the license
grant is conditioned constitute copyright infringement; violations of
other provisions would be contractual breaches. As with software, a
user who has already used a digital code could not then transfer the
code to another user in violation of a “no transfer/no copying” clause
because, although temporary, streamed content is still copied
regardless of the type of violation (copyright infringement or
contractual breach), and the terms of use typically grant the copyright
holder (through the hosting service) the right to control and
discontinue the user’s access to the content. If the terms of service
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state that the copyright holder retains control, whether the violation is
rooted in contract or copyright, the user’s ability to access content may
be terminated.
Contractual language may be used in copyright transactions in
two different ways. First, it can demonstrate the licensor’s continuing
control over the copyright item (which would indicate a license rather
than a sale). Second, it can create a condition or a covenant, which
determines whether the licensee’s act constitutes infringement or a
contractual breach.
Contract law requires that the parties use clear and unambiguous
language to create an express condition.313 Courts will interpret
ambiguous language as a promise rather than an express condition,
especially if interpreting it as an express condition would result in a
forfeiture.314 In order for contractual language to constitute a condition
of the copyright license, it must implicate one of the exclusive
statutory rights of the Licensor and be drafted clearly to indicate words
of condition, such as provided that or the if . . . then duo. Contractual
language can be helpful in characterizing a transaction as a license or
a sale, even if it is not determinative. The following examples illustrate
how a restriction should be interpreted in a software license
agreement. These examples assume a negotiated agreement between
businesses; provisions in adhesive form contacts should also meet the
reasonable expectations test. 315
Example 1:
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable
license to make two copies, use, and display the Software on one
device. This is a license and not a sale of the Software.”
In the above, the language is not conditional, and the Licensee
may sell the Software (and the license that accompanies it). Even
though the language states that the license is “non-transferable,”
313. See Richard F. Kline, Inc. v. Shook Excavating & Hauling, Inc., 885 A.2d 381, 388 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (stating that if the language is doubtful, the language will be interpreted as a
promise or constructive condition rather than an express condition).
314. Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon, & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y.
1995) (noting that “[t]his interpretive preference is especially strong when a finding of express
condition would increase the risk of forfeiture”).
315. The lack of bargaining power underlies the unfairness of adhesive forms and may affect
small businesses as well as consumers. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining
Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 141 (2005) (arguing that the legal conception of bargaining power
is unrealistic and “systematically disadvantage[s] parties who do not fit within the courts’
traditional narratives of disempowerment”).
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transferability is not one of the Licensor’s exclusive rights as a
copyright owner, so it does not limit the scope of the license. Although
the Licensee may sell the Software to Customer, the Licensee and
Customer must not exceed the scope of the license. The sale is of the
license to the software, not of the underlying intellectual property. If
the Licensee sells the software, it cannot retain copies because the
license is limited to the right to make two copies, and to use and
display the Software on one device.
Example 2:
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive, non-transferable
license to make two copies, use, and display the Software on one
device. Licensee agrees to pay the fees listed on Schedule 1.”
The language above creates a covenant. If Licensee sells the
Software to Customer, Licensor may sue for breach of contract but not
for infringement as long as the Licensee and Customer do not exceed
the scope of the license.316
Example 3:
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two
copies, use, and display the Software on one device provided that
Licensee may not transfer, assign, or sell the Software to any party.
The license grant is expressly conditioned upon Licensee’s
compliance with this provision.”
The clause contains words that signal a condition. Yet, a court
may be reluctant to construe the language as creating a condition if
doing so would result in a forfeiture of the Licensee’s rights under the
agreement. The prohibition against transfers does not implicate one of
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights, and thus, a violation of that
provision cannot be considered an infringement. More importantly,
unless the Licensor retains rights to control the software (e.g., remote
control, right to terminate), the transaction should be characterized as
sale, and not a license. The Licensee may transfer the software, but the
transferee must abide by the terms of the license grant with respect to
copying and displaying the software.
Example 4:
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two
copies, use, and display the Software if and only so long as Licensee

316. This does not mean, however, that Licensor would prevail on a breach of contract claim.
The Licensee could raise contract defenses, such as unconscionability.
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does not transfer, assign or sell the Software to any party. The license
grant is expressly conditioned upon Licensee’s compliance with this
provision. If Licensee attempts to transfer, assign, or sell the Software,
this license immediately terminates and is void.”
In the above example, the intent of the parties to create a condition
to the license is clear. Consequently, it might be much more difficult
for a court to find a covenant rather than a condition in a negotiated
agreement. However, to avoid a forfeiture, the transaction may still be
characterized as a sale of the license if the Licensor does not retain
rights to control the software. In that case, the prohibition against
transferring should fail (similar to Example 3), although the transferee
must abide by the terms of the license grant.
Example 5:
“Licensor grants Licensee a non-exclusive license to make two
copies, use, and display the Software if and only if Licensee has paid
the fees set forth in Schedule 1 within thirty days of the date of the
invoice.”
The intent of the parties is clearly to condition the license grant
on payment of the license fee. There would be no forfeiture because
the Licensee had not paid the license fees. Accordingly, failure to pay
the license fees means the license grant is invalid and continued use
by the Licensee will be considered infringement.
C. Visualizing the Methodology: Two Flow Charts
The license v. sale quandary is complex because the analysis must
run along two different axes. The first involves characterizing the
transaction—is it a license or a sale? The second axis involves
analyzing the nature and effect of the contractual terms—did it involve
a contract or a covenant, meaning did the licensee infringe or breach?
Each line of inquiry differs depending upon whether the transaction
involves a patent or a copyright. There are, however, two caveats
where the terms are contained in an adhesive standard form contract.
First, the contract must be properly formed, which may be subject to
dispute if the legal nature of the form is not reasonably communicated
and the consumer has not actively and deliberately manifested
consent. Second, even if the contract is properly formed, the terms
should meet the reasonable expectations test.
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V. CONCLUSION
Licensing goods—rather than selling them outright—was an
important way for businesses to protect themselves from opportunistic
buyers who took advantage of legal gaps to exploit new product
offerings. To encourage innovation and allow businesses to reap the
rewards from their investments, courts accepted the idea of licensing
as a way to impose post-sale restrictions. In doing so, they accepted a
watered-down version of assent for the purposes of contract
formation.317 Today, businesses exploit the licensing model to impose
onerous contractual terms and defeat reasonable expectations to use
products.
The license v. sale question looms over the IOT and the
proliferation of goods that are both licensed and sold. The stew of
judicial opinions and the different adhesive contracting forms portend
doctrinal chaos. This Article proposes a way to resolve the license v.
sale dilemma that considers the reasonable expectations of parties. The
methodology is complex because the underlying issues are intertwined
and involve multiple strands of law; however, it may help steer the
case law toward a more unified and predictable approach and away
from doctrinal incoherence.
Some may argue that requiring adherents to standard form
contracts to specifically assent to terms would undermine the
efficiency of using standard forms. Yet, the benefits of transactional
efficiency should not accrue to only one party.318 While both parties
could potentially benefit from the use of adhesive standard forms, only
the drafting entity benefits when the forms contain one-sided terms
that take advantage of the other party. Imposing the standard of
“reasonable expectations” upon standard form contracts preserves the
efficiency of form contracts while imbuing it with fairness.
Others might argue that having consumers specifically assent
would not right the imbalance because businesses would continue to
have more power to offer terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
317. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 175, 203 (2009) (noting that modern contract law makes contract formation “much
easier”). Hart notes that because mutual assent is easy to establish, modern contract law suffers
from the “process problem” that requires relying upon policing doctrines to bad bargains and so
places “the burden . . . on the coerced party to prove that a contract term(s) is unreasonable using
one or more of the expanded contract policing doctrines.” Id. at 202–12.
318. While some might argue that the use of standard forms results in lower prices for
consumers, there is a dearth of evidence to support this claim.
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Furthermore, consumers would likely not read even if they were
forced to click more frequently. The purpose of a specific assent
requirement, however, is not primarily to encourage consumers to read
but to discourage businesses from imposing too many terms. Although
bargaining parity and substantive fairness with standard forms may be
unrealistic, introducing a transactional hurdle such as specific assent
to certain terms—even if those terms remain unread—adds friction to
the transaction and so negatively affects the consumer’s experience
with the company and the company’s product or service. This negative
experience diminishes the good will that the consumer has toward the
company. The contracting experience becomes part of the product
offering and can enhance or diminish a customer’s interaction with the
business. In addition, it would increase the salience of the term and
may result in increased competition; it may also attract the attention
of regulators or lawmakers. The proposed methodology does not
resolve the normative question whether businesses should be
permitted to license rather than sell their goods and services. The
normative question is a policy question that requires a broader
discussion of incentives. However, a specific assent requirement
aligns with the goals of contract law and forces companies to be more
transparent about their intentions or suffer the consequences in terms
of loss of customer good will and negative publicity.

